70 years ago on this date,
April 13, 1945, the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend fell from Vienna, Austria. I will post information
about Adolf Hitler’s child soldiers, the 12th
SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend from
Wikipedia and other links.
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Captured soldiers from the 12th SS Panzer
Division "Hitlerjugend".
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| Unit insignia of 12. SS-Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend. The symbol was the result of a competition. |
Active
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1943–45
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Country
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Nazi Germany
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Allegiance
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Adolf Hitler
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Branch
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Waffen-SS
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Type
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Panzer
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Role
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Armoured warfare
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Size
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Division
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Part of
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I SS Panzer Corps
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Commanders
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Notable
commanders |
Fritz Witt
Kurt Meyer Hugo Kraas |
The
12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend ("Hitler Youth")
was a German Waffen-SS armoured division during World War II. The Hitlerjugend
was unique because the majority of its junior enlisted men were drawn from
members of the Hitler Youth, while the
senior NCOs and officers were generally veterans of the Eastern Front.
The
division, with 20,540 personnel, first saw action on 7 June 1944 as part of the
German defense of the Caen area during the Normandy campaign. The battle for
Normandy took its toll on the division and it came out of the Falaise pocket
with a divisional strength of 12,000 men.
Following
the invasion battles, the division was sent to Germany for refitting. On 16
December 1944, the division was committed against the US Army in the Battle of
the Bulge. After the failure of the Ardennes offensive the division was sent
east to fight the Red Army near Budapest. The 12th SS eventually withdrew into
Austria; on 8 May 1945, the surviving 10,000 men surrendered to the US Army at
Enns. At 7:20 am, Captain McLean reported that two lieutenant colonels and
a major approached troops of Major General Stanley Eric Reinhart, announcing
that within two hours the end of their column would reach the city.
The
reputation of the division has been affected by war crimes committed by members
of the division during the early battles in Normandy.
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Panzergrenadiers
on a Panzer
IV during training 1943. Some idea of how young members of the division
were can be obtained from this picture
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Formation and training
The
idea of a Waffen-SS division composed of Hitlerjugend
(HJ) members was first proposed by SS-Gruppenführer
Gottlob
Berger in January 1943. Berger approached Reichsführer-SS
Heinrich Himmler with the proposition, and
Himmler soon became an enthusiastic advocate. The plan for a combat division
made up of all Hitlerjugend members born in 1926 was passed on to Adolf
Hitler for his approval. Hitler was also enthusiastic about the idea, and
on 13 February 1943, the official order for the creation of an Hitlerjugend
division was issued.
Berger
nominated himself as the divisional commander, but Himmler instead chose 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte
SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) veteran, SS-Oberführer
Fritz Witt.
A
competition was held to design insignia for the new unit. The winning design,
picked from thousands of entries, depicted the Hitlerjugend sigrune
crossing a key from the 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH's insignia.
By
1 September 1943, over 16,000 recruits had completed their six-week basic
training and were listed on the rosters of the SS Panzergrenadier Division
Hitlerjugend. As training continued in Beverloo
Camp, Belgium, the division was notified that it was to be formed as a panzer rather than
a panzergrenadier
unit, and the division was redesignated SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend.
Many of the recruits were so young that they were supplied with sweets instead
of the standard tobacco and alcohol
ration. In late October 1943 the division received its final designation, 12th
SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend.
While
the Hitlerjugend members, who had grown up under NSDAP propaganda,
were committed to the Nazi cause, they had no military experience. To provide a
skilled backbone for the division, veterans from the 1st SS Panzer Division
LSSAH were assigned to the Hitlerjugend division and provided all the
regimental, battalion and most of the company commanders. However, the SS could
not provide all the officers required and 50 army officers were assigned. They served in
their army uniforms but were completely part of the division.
Training for the division was unusual. Witt, realizing that his division had to
be made ready for combat as quickly as possible, ignored many rules and
regulations and instead focused on realistic combat scenarios and live-fire
exercises. A result of this was that the morale of the 12th SS was
exceptionally high, and the relationship between the officers, NCOs and men was
an informal one, based on mutual trust and respect.
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Hitlerjugend Panzer IV crews on
parade, Belgium ~Jan/Feb 1944
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Hitler Youth visit the 12th SS Panzer
Division, 21 March 1944 in Belgium
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In
March 1944 the 12th SS was deemed ready for active service and was ordered to
move to Caen in
Normandy and became part of the I
SS Panzer Corps. Throughout the spring of 1944 the division continued
training exercises in the peaceful area around Caen, familiarizing itself with
the terrain. This proved invaluable in the months that followed. On 27 May,
Witt celebrated his 36th birthday and his recent promotion to SS-Brigadeführer.
The peaceful 'holiday atmosphere', as one grenadier described it, was soon
shattered.
At
the beginning of June 1944 the division was declared ready for combat
operations. The Division's tank strength at this time was about 66 Panther
and 90+ Panzer
IV tanks. The division was also equipped with Jagdpanzer
IV tank destroyers, three prototype Wirbelwind
flakpanzer vehicles, along with a number of 20 mm, 37 mm and 88 mm flak guns, Hummel, Wespe and sIG 33
self-propelled guns and regular towed artillery pieces.
Its
tank
destroyer unit, the 12th SS Panzerjäger
Battalion, however, was not considered ready for action and was understrength
in Jagdpanzer
IVs.
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An SS-Panzergrenadier in Normandy, 21 June
1944
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Normandy campaign
On
6 June 1944, the Western Allies launched Operation Overlord, the invasion of France. The
12th SS Panzer Division, along with the 21st Panzer Division, were the closest
Panzer divisions to the landing beaches, but they were unable to move until
they got authorization from Hitler. The 12th SS was not ordered to the front
until 1430 hours on 6 June, over twelve hours after the first reports of the
landings. Prior to this Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt had ordered over half of the division to deal with a parachute
landing on the coast near Lisieux which were found to be dummies from Operation
Titanic. Kurt Meyer's 25th SS Panzergrenadier
Regiment and Max Wünsche's 12th SS Panzer Regiment were the lead
elements of the Division as it started for Normandy from their base to the west
of Paris and South of Rouen.
The
Division's advance to Normandy and the British/Canadian landing beaches of Sword
and Juno
was severely hampered by the incessant allied fighter-bomber attacks. The losses to Allied
aircraft were not heavy, but the delays caused by wrecked vehicles were enough
to destroy the Division's timetable. The first units of the 12th SS finally
reached their assembly area near Evrecy at 2200 hours on 6 June.
At
1000 hours on 7 June, Kurt Meyer's 25th SS Panzergrenadier
Regiment, along with 50 Panzer IV tanks of the 2nd Battalion of Max
Wünsche's 12th SS Panzer Regiment, arrived and moved into position north
west of Caen. Supported by a battalion of artillery (3rd Battalion, 12th SS
Panzer Regiment), this battle group was ordered to crush the advancing Canadian
infantry and tanks and drive through to the coast, a few kilometres away. In
Meyer's words they were to "throw the fish into the sea". Meyer had
three Panzergrenadier battalions and two companies of tanks
on each flank with artillery in support. While planning to start his attack at
1600 hours, Meyer's hand was forced at about 1400 hours by a battlegroup of the
North Nova Scotia Highlanders and
tanks of the 27th Tank Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers) who were advancing to
Carpiquet. Watching the Canadian advance unfold from the tower of the Ardenne
Abbey, he saw an opportunity opening in front of him. The Canadians
continued to file across the German front. Once the lead Canadian tanks reached
the ridge south of Franqueville, they
spotted one of the panzer companies waiting in ambush (they had allowed the
tanks to move forward without firing a shot). Meyer reported that "The
battalion maintained excellent fire discipline" and the advancing tanks
moving across the front were then hit in their unprotected flank by the tanks
of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment. The attack by the 12th SS had caught the
Canadians by surprise, and their infantry were forced to fall back to Authie
with Meyer's 3rd Battalion in pursuit. They captured Authie and Franqueville in
their initial attack and the next objective was Buron, a kilometer to
the north.
Although
the attacks destroyed many Canadian tanks and overran a company of the North Nova
Scotia Highlanders in Authie, they failed to break through the Canadians around
Buron. Meyer, however, countermanded the divisional commander's order on his
own initiative, feeling that objective unrealistic, and hoped to merely stop
the flow of Canadian units inland until the situation could be stabilized.
The
attack by the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend was supposed to have
been supported by the 21st Panzer Division but they
could not disengage from fighting the British 3rd Infantry Division
and were still at Couvre, as a result the right flank
was open and being probed by Canadian tanks, which were destroyed by the
anti-tank platoon of the 1st Battalion. During these attacks the 12th SS had
captured about 150 prisoners from the North Nova Scotia Highlanders and
crews from the 27th Tank Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers). According to Lieutenant
Colonel Mel Gordon the 27th Tank Regiment had lost 28 Sherman
tanks and the North Nova Scotia Highlanders 245 men on 7 June. Casualties
of the 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment amounted to about 300 men. 15 Tanks
from the 12th SS Panzer Regiment were also destroyed.
Late
on 7 June, the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment under command of SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Wilhelm
Mohnke arrived on the battlefield. Meyer's attack had pushed back one part
of the Canadian advance but to the west of Meyer, the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade had
occupied a group of small villages three kilometres into the German line. The
26th Panzergrenadier Regiment crossed behind Meyer's regiment and took up
positions to their west. After planning and positioning the regiment for a
powerful thrust the 1st Battalion launched an attack towards Norrey-en-Bessin,
defended by the Regina Rifles of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 3rd Canadian Division. Their orders were to
overrun the Canadians and force a deep wedge between them and the British
division to the west. No reconnaissance of the Canadian positions was done and
the infantry met a maelstrom of defensive fire from firmly established
positions.
The
attack, launched at 0330 hours, 8 June – had little initial success. The
various companies in the attacking Battalion failed to co-ordinate their moves
towards the Canadians and, despite high casualties, Canadian artillery and
supporting heavy machine guns of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa took a
heavy toll on each attacking company of SS troops. The Regina Rifles held their
ground and the 1st Battalion fell back. The division was criticized for
performing inadequately in the opening days of the Normandy campaign. and
Canadian Brigadier Harry Foster later noted that:
No use was made of the fact that the Reginas' flanks were exposed; instead, 'the enemy flung himself straight against the strongest points and utterly failed to exploit the undoubted weakness of his opponent's position.
On
the Canadian right the 2nd Battalion attacked the Royal Winnipeg Rifles defending the village
of Putot-en-Bessin at 0630 hours. The Battalion managed
to break into the village and surround several companies, effectively pushing
the Winnipeg Rifles out of the village by 1300 hours and inflicting 256
casualties – of which 175 were taken prisoner. A counter-attack launched at
2030 hours by the Canadian Scottish, however, regained
Putot-en-Bessin, and the II Battalion withdrew and dug-in south of the village.
With neither side able to secure complete victory the lines on either side were
becoming fixed and turning the battle into one of attrition to capture the
surrounding villages.
A
company of Panther tanks arrived late on 8 June, and Meyer personally
led a night attack toward the village of Rots, which they reached at midnight.
After several hours of fighting, however, the 12th SS were forced to withdraw,
leaving behind six tanks. The Canadians noted that, despite advancing with
courage and determination, the young Germans seemed to lack tactical control
and had a habit of attacking piecemeal and failed to exploit favorable
opportunities.
Despite
the ferocity of the 12th SS counterattacks, the Division failed to fulfill its
orders to throw the attacking allies back into the sea. British troops had
moved up on either side of the positions now firmly held by the troops of the
3rd Canadian Infantry Division and had also established a firm line from which
they could develop future operations.
What
followed were a series of local attacks by both sides. Neither was able to
secure any strategic advantage, and the German defensive perimeter around Caen
tightened. Casualties on both sides steadily mounted. The 12th SS headquarters,
positioned in Venoix some 2 kilometers southwest of Caen, came under naval
gunfire on 14 June, killing the commander, Fritz Witt,
and several other senior officers. The High Command appointed Kurt Meyer as the
new commander of the division. (some sources believe he was the youngest
divisional commander on any side during the war).
The
12th SS was now deployed in detachments north and west of Caen, and like the
rest of the German Army, was suffering from shortages of ammunition, fuel and
equipment. To the north of Caen, some of its Panzers supported unreliable units
such as the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division and to the
west, a flak battery
and 15 tanks, together with the 1st Battalion, 26th SS Panzergrenadier
Regiment, held the important Carpiquet airfield.
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British POWs captured by the Hitlerjugend,
21 June 1944 (possibly 46th Commando)
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British POWs captured by the Hitlerjugend,
21 June 1944 (possibly 46th Commando)
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The
3rd Canadian Division ceased major combat operations until July, with only one
day of major operations, on 11 June, at Le Mesnil-Patry. This saw the 12th SS
inflict major casualties to the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and the 1st Hussars
(6th Armoured Regiment) which lost 51 Sherman
tanks during the attack.
Also
on 11 June the 46th Royal Marine Commando assaulted Rots. The official
historian of Le Régiment de la Chaudière, described
the scene the following day:
They fought like lions on both sides, so that the dead lay corpse by corpse. We searched every house, every courtyard to avoid ambush. And here is the confirmation of how ferocious last night's battle must have been. The Commandos lie dead in rows beside the dead SS. Grenades are scattered all over the road and in the porches of houses. Here we see a Commando and an SS man, literally dead in each others arms, having slaughtered each other. There, a German and a Canadian tank have engaged each other to destruction, and are still smoldering, and from each blackened turret hangs the charred corpse of a machine gunner. Over here are a group who ran towards a wall for shelter and were shot down before they got there. And then near the church, as the advance guard of C Company and the carriers turn the corner, there are three Germans. Only three. But one of them instantly draws his pistol and hits one of our men. A Bren gunner kills two of the three SS men, but the survivor gets away. Now we understand with what kind of fanatic we have to deal.
The
following two weeks until the end of the month, was a period of relative quiet,
as both sides were exhausted. What did not stop was the constant Allied
artillery, naval bombardment and air attacks. Major operations for both sides
began again in July. Losses were suffered when the 12th SS successfully
defended the Carpiquet airfield (which the Canadians called Operation
Windsor) though the village of Carpiquet itself fell as only fifty men were
available to defend it from an attack by an entire Canadian battalion.
More
attacks during Operation Charnwood fell upon the Division the
following week. Vicious hand-to-hand fighting took place in various locations,
notably at Buron with the Highland Light Infantry of Canada
on 8 July where the Highland Light Infantry lost 262 men in a single day of
combat with the 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment.
The
division was driven from its positions in nearby villages of Gruchy and Cussy
as well, and the divisional command post in the Ardenne Abbey, which had been
occupied since before D-Day, was also lost.
For
the next four days, the 12th SS held out against repeated attacks by the British I Corps. Finally 2,600 tons of
bombs were dropped on Caen by the Royal
Air Force. The bombing destroyed much of the city and caused further
problems for the German supply line. Meyer, unwilling to retire, continued his
bitter defense. Eventually though, the British were able to penetrate into the
city, forcing the Germans to prepare to withdraw from Caen. On 8 July, after
all hope of holding the city was lost, Meyer ignoring his orders ordered the
evacuation of the city and the remnants of the Division withdrew to the south
of Caen.
Operation Jupiter began on 10 July, while
some elements of the 12th SS still held part of the line between Eterville and
the Orne River. Although they held the line for a time, the defenders were
eventually overcome by sheer numbers. A young grenadier noted in his diary what
it was like to face the British:
From 0630 to 0800, again heavy machine-gun fire. Then Tommy attacks with great masses of infantry and many tanks. We fight as long as possible but we realize we are in a losing position. By the time the survivors try to pull back, we realize we are surrounded.
The
following day, the division was pulled out of the line and sent to Potigny, some 30
kilometers north of Falaise, for a rest and refit.
The
division was to have little respite though, and on 19 July were under attack by
Anglo-Canadian forces Operation Goodwood. Following this the division
was pulled out of the line and used to form the mobile reserve for I
SS Panzer Corps. Goodwood was followed by Operation
Cobra on 25 July, during which the German line finally broke, leading to
the breakout of the Americans to the west.
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A Panzer IV
of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 21 June 1944 at Rouen
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A captured Panzergrenadier of the
Hitlerjugend taken by a Canadian Intelligence Unit during the fighting for
Caen. The official Public Archives of Canada caption for this photo taken a
month after the activities in question, contains no information about the
prisoner other than his division. Note: both allied soldiers are wearing the
British P-1944 "Turtle" Mk III steel helmet, which was introduced
shortly before D-Day. The Mk III helmet was much superior to the conventional
"Brodie" helmet normally worn by British & Commonwealth soldiers.
The soldier nearest the camera is holding a .303" Lee Enfield rifle in his
right hand. (August 9, 1944)
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August 1944
On
8 August the Canadian First Army launched Operation Totalize, a night attack without a preliminary
artillery barrage. The point of the attack was again directed at the 12th SS.
The attack started well and once they reached their objectives, the infantry
started to clear out the defenders. The 12th SS Panzerjager
Battalion held up the Canadians after an advance of five kilometres, with two
member of the Battalion being awarded the Knight's Cross – SS-Oberscharführer
Rudolf Roy
and his gunner Fritz Eckstein who had knocked out eight tanks on 8
August. The next day they knocked out a further 13 tanks and within 5 days had
knocked out a total of 26 tanks. Over the next two days, this action and
continued series of counterattacks reduced the 12th SS to little more than a
large Kampfgruppe.
The
Allies next tried to blast their way through with Operation Tractable, but the 12th SS had
captured a copy of the plan on 13 August, and Meyer created a defensive line
with what remained of his division.
The
Division, now reduced to 15 tanks, was called upon to defend Hill 159 northwest of Falaise
between 14 and 16 August. Under almost continuous artillery and air attack, the
12th SS were forced to withdraw when the 2nd Canadian Division broke through on their
western flank.
With
only one avenue of escape left open, what was left of the 12th SS were ordered
to help hold open the northern side of the Falaise gap,
so what was left of the German 7th Army could escape. When the
withdrawal had been completed, Meyer ordered a Frenchman to guide the Division
across the Dives River.
After
crossing the Dives Army Group B reported on 22 August that the 12th SS Panzer
Division Hitlerjugend now consisted of only 10 tanks and no artillery.
The battles in Normandy and lack of any reinforcements had nearly decimated the
Division.
During August the division played an important part in keeping the withdrawal routes open for many German units. The division itself did not suffer unduly. From 15 to 22 August its casualties amounted to 45 killed, 248 wounded and 655 missing ... In many publications it has been said that the (division) only had a few hundred men after the end of the Falaise battle on 22 August. This is completely wrong. According to the very thorough research in the records of casualties suffered by the division presented by Meyer, it is clear that the division lost about 8,000 officers and men, killed, wounded and missing ... (and) ... it is clear it had around 12,000 men on 22 August 1944. Even though most of its infantry were casualties, the division was far from destroyed.
The
units in the Division that were not fit for combat were ordered to pull back to
Germany on 8 September, leaving behind a small Kampfgruppe attached to
the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich. It was formed around the 2nd
Battalion, 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment with a mixed artillery battalion.
The
Division losses during the fighting in Normandy were severe, in the three
months from June to September, 55 officers, 229 NCOs and 1,548 had been killed.
A further 128 officers, 613 NCOs and 3,684 had been wounded with 58 officers,
182 NCOs and 2,012 reported missing. This was a combined total of 241 officers,
1,024 NCOs and 7,244 men.
In
all, the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend suffered a total of 8,569
casualties out of a strength of 20,540 men; a casualty rate of 42%. It had also
lost 94% of its armour and almost all of its artillery.
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Panzergrenadiers of the SS-Armored Division
"Hitlerjugend" lined up to be awarded with the “Iron Cross” [July
1944]
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Members of a Hitlerjugend company of
the Volkssturm at the German-Soviet front in Pyritz, Pomerania, February
1945.
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Withdrawal – Wacht am Rhein
On
14 January 1945, Dietrich's 6th
SS Panzer Army was ordered east to Hungary where it was to take part in an
offensive to recapture the Hungarian oilfields and open the way to Budapest, where
45,000 men of the IX SS Mountain Corps
had been encircled.
While
the division was in transit, the IV SS Panzer Corps launched several ill-fated
relief operations. The 12th SS, alongside the LSSAH as a part of I
SS Panzer Corps arrived in Hungary in early February 1945, only a few days
before the city fell. The division was thrown into action against the Gran
Bridgehead, a strong position formed by the Soviets over the Danube near the
town of Gran.
The 12th SS and the LSSAH both fought well, and by the end of February the
bridgehead had been destroyed.
The
division was next to take part in Operation Frühlingserwachen (Spring
Awakening), the operation to retake the Hungarian oilfields. Adolf
Hitler, desperate to keep the operation a secret, had ordered that no
reconnaissance of the battlefield was allowed before the attack began. The
attack got underway on 6 March 1945, in atrocious conditions. The spring thaw
meant that the German attack was confined to a few narrow roads and, after
initial successes, the offensive was aborted after a Soviet counterattack
threatened to encircle the German forces. After the failure of Frühlingserwachen,
Hitler lost faith in the Waffen-SS and ordered that the honorary cuffbands
issued to the divisions involved in the attack be returned. Outraged at the
order, Dietrich refused to pass it on to his men.
In
mid-March, a heavy Soviet attack near Stuhlweissenberg
split Army Group Balck in half and resulted
in a general withdrawal towards Vienna. The 12th SS was involved in many desperate rearguard
actions, and on 13 April fell back from Vienna. Withdrawing through Odenburg and Hirtenberg,
the division reached Linz,
Austria near the American lines. On 8 May 1945, 10,000 survivors of the
division surrendered to Major General Stanley Eric Reinhart, commander of the
65th Infantry Division, near Enns.
Hungary – Austria
On
14 January 1945, Dietrich's 6th SS Panzer Army was ordered east to Hungary
where it was to take part in an offensive to recapture the Hungarian oilfields
and open the way to Budapest, where 45,000 men of the IX SS Mountain Corps had
been encircled.
While
the division was in transit, the IV SS Panzer Corps launched several ill-fated
relief operations. The 12th SS, alongside the LSSAH as a part of I SS Panzer
Corps arrived in Hungary in early February 1945, only a few days before the
city fell. The division was thrown into action against the Gran Bridgehead, a
strong position formed by the Soviets over the Danube near the town of Gran.
The 12th SS and the LSSAH both fought well, and by the end of February the
bridgehead had been destroyed.
The
division was next to take part in Operation Frühlingserwachen (Spring
Awakening), the operation to retake the Hungarian oilfields. Adolf
Hitler, desperate to keep the operation a secret, had ordered that no
reconnaissance of the battlefield was allowed before the attack began. The
attack got underway on 6 March 1945, in atrocious conditions. The spring thaw
meant that the German attack was confined to a few narrow roads and, after
initial successes, the offensive was aborted after a Soviet counterattack
threatened to encircle the German forces. After the failure of Frühlingserwachen,
Hitler lost faith in the Waffen-SS and ordered that the honorary cuffbands
issued to the divisions involved in the attack be returned. Outraged at the
order, Dietrich refused to pass it on to his men.
In
mid-March, a heavy Soviet attack near Stuhlweissenberg split Army Group Balck
in half and resulted in a general withdrawal towards Vienna. The 12th SS was
involved in many desperate rearguard actions, and on 13 April fell back from
Vienna. Withdrawing through Odenburg and Hirtenberg, the division reached Linz,
Austria near the American lines. On 8 May 1945, 10,000 survivors of the
division surrendered to Major General Stanley Eric Reinhart, commander of the
65th Infantry Division, near Enns.
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The Ardennes Abbey in the Calvados
department of Normandy, in France.
Largely restored after it was used as an observation post for the German army
in the Battle of Normandy. Approximately 27 Canadian
prisoners of war were executed in or around the Abbey.
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Memorial to Canadian prisoners of war
executed in the garden of the Ardenne Abbey, in the Calvados region of Normandy
in France.
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War crimes
War
crimes were committed by the men of the Hitlerjugend division—they executed
around 156 Canadian soldiers after capturing them. These murders and the
consequent search for justice are well documented. Two British soldiers from
the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry
Division were also murdered during the killing of Canadian prisoners.
On
2 April 1944 the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend executed 86 people in the
North French town of Ascq.(see
the Ascq
massacre)
Between
7 and 8 June 1944, Canadian prisoners were executed by elements of Kurt Meyer's
25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment at the Ardenne Abbey just to the west of Caen.
As this was Meyer's command post, he, along with several subordinates, were
charged with this crime after the war. Testimony at Meyer's war crimes trial,
later deprecated, suggested that Meyer later made it clear he expected no
prisoners to be taken during subsequent fighting. The evidence for this (called
Exhibit T3, a handwritten testimony) was a set of secret orders given during
training that was remembered by SS-Schütze F. Tobanisch who said that
receipts of these orders had to be signed by all soldiers. No supporting
testimony was provided and the witness was not available to the court. Also on
7 June the bodies of men, from the 21st Panzer Division and staff
from 12th SS, were found shot in the head near Rots, which may have been a
factor in the execution of the prisoners, according to Meyer.
All
the charges against the 12th SS are dated between 6–17 June. No official
encouragement of those events has been documented, unlike the situation of the
Canadian forces where Meyer claims that a "no prisoners" edict was in
place as evidenced by documents captured from Canadian officers at the time.
According to Meyer, the 12th SS Panzer Division returned three times the level
of prisoners as other divisions.
After
the war, Meyer was tried and condemned to death by a Canadian military court
for collusion in the shooting of Canadian and British prisoners. The main
weight of the Prosecution's case rested on Jan Jesionek. Jesionek was a Pole
who is alleged to have been forcibly conscripted into the Waffen-SS from which
he deserted. Jesionek's testimony was refuted by Meyer and as a result Meyer's
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by Canadian Major General Christopher
Vokes, who considered all evidence against him circumstantial. Vokes
recognized that in the heat of battle it was often difficult to decide who had
killed an enemy and who had murdered a prisoner. There was no direct proof
Meyer ordered the murder of Canadian prisoners but it was clear from physical
evidence collected after the fighting that dozens of unarmed Canadians had been
murdered after being interrogated by Meyer, who at the time, was the commander
of 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. This can also be considered retaliation for
what Canadian soldiers did to three captured German officers by tying them to
their vehicles. Two were subsequently shot and killed while passing through the
lines; the third one managed to crawl back to his lines where he subsequently
died 3 days later. As the unit's commander, Meyer – while not guilty of the
murders – was held fully responsible for the crimes committed by soldiers under
his direct command.
Order of Battle June 1944
- Divisional HQ
- Brigadeführer Fritz Witt (Killed in action 14 June 1944)
- Oberführer Kurt Meyer (from 14 June 1944)
- Sturmbannführer Hubert Meyer (from 6 September 1944)
- Brigadeführer Fritz Kraemer (from 24 October 1944)
- Brigadeführer Hugo Kraas (from 13 November 1944 – 8 May 1945)
- 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment Hitlerjugend, Standartenführer Kurt Meyer (until 14 June 1944), Obersturmbannführer Karl-Heinz Milius (from 14 June 1944)
- I. Battalion, Sturmbannführer, Hans Waldmüller (Killed in action 8 September 1944)
- 1st Company
- 2nd Company
- 3rd Company
- 4th (Heavy) Company
- II. Battalion, Sturmbannführer Hans Scappini (Killed in action 7 June 1944)
- 4 x Companies as per I.Btn
- III. Battalion, Obersturmbannführer Karl-Heinz Milius (until 14 June 1944), Obersturmbannführer Fritz Steiger (from 14 June 1944)
- 4x Companies as per I.Btn
- 13th (Panzerabwehrkanone) Company, Erwin Kaminski
- 14th Flak Company, Hauptsturmführer Brantl
- 15th Reconnaissance Company, Horst von Büttner (Killed in action 8–9 June 1944)
- 16th (Pionier) Company, Emil Werner
- 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment Hitlerjugend, Standartenführer Wilhelm Mohnke
- I. Battalion, Sturmbannführer Bernhard Krause
- 1st Company
- 2nd Company
- 3rd Company
- 4th (Heavy) Company
- II. Battalion, Sturmbannführer Bernhard Siebken
- 4x Companies as per I.Btn
- III. Battalion, Sturmbannführer Erich Olboeter
- 4x Companies as per I.Btn
- 13th (Panzerabwehrkanone) Company, Obersturmführer Polanski
- 14th Flak Company, Obersturmführer Martin Stolze
- 15th Reconnaissance Company, Obersturmführer Bayer
- 16th (Pionier) Company, Obersturmführer Trompke
- 12th SS Panzer Regiment, Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche
- I. Battalion (66+ x Panther tanks), Sturmbannführer Arnold Jürgensen
- 1st Company
- 2nd Company
- 3rd Company
- 4th Company
- Repair Company
- II. Battalion (96 x Panzer IV), Sturmbannführer Karl-Heinz Prinz
- 5th Company
- 6th Company
- 7th Company
- 8th Company
- 9th Company
- Repair Company
- 12th SS Artillery Regiment, Sturmbannführer Fritz Schröder
- I. Battalion (12 x Wespe SP-Artillery, 6 x Hummel SP-Artillery)
- II. Battalion (18 x 105 mm LeFH 18 (towed howitzers))
- III. Battalion (12 x 150 mm SFH (towed heavy howitzers), 4 x 105 mm Kanone (towed howitzers))
- 12th SS Motorcycle Regiment
- 12th SS Reconnaissance Battalion, Sturmbannführer Gerhard Bremer
- 1st Company, Obersturmführer Peter Hansmann
- 2nd Company, Obersturmführer Walter Hauck
- 3rd Company, Obersturmführer Keue
- 4th Company, Obersturmführer Heinz Beiersdorf
- 5th (Heavy) Company, Hauptsturmführer Gerd von Reitzenstein
- 12th SS Panzerjäger Battalion, Sturmbannführer Jacob Hanreich
- 1st Battery
- 2nd Battery
- 12th SS Werfer Battalion, Hauptsturmführer Willy Müller
- I Battery (4 x 150 mm Nebelwerfer)
- II Battery (4 x 150 mm Nebelwerfer)
- III Battery (4 x 150 mm Nebelwerfer)
- 12th SS Flak Battalion, Hauptsturmführer Rudolf Fend
- I Battery (4 x 88mm flak gun)
- II Battery (4 x 88 mm flak gun)
- III Battery (4 x 88 mm flak gun)
- IV Battery (9 x 3.7 cm FlaK 43)
- 12th SS Pioneer Battalion, Sturmbannführer Siegfried Müller
- 1st Company
- 2nd Company
- 3rd Company
- Motorised Bridging Unit
- 12th SS Panzer Signals Battalion, Hauptsturmführer Erich Pandel
- 12th SS Instandsetzungs, Hauptsturmführer Artur Manthey
- 12th SS Nachschub Truppen, Hauptsturmführer Rudolf Kolitz
- 12th SS Wirtschafts Battalion
- 12th SS Fuhrerbewerber Lehrgange
- 12th SS War Reporter platoon (mot)
- 12th SS Feldgendarmerie Company
- 12th SS Field post office
- 12th SS Medical Battalion, Sturmbannführer Rolf Schulz M.D.
Hitlerjugend
vs US Army
VIDEO SOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNsKbBDzBAk
OTHER
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