On
this date, 17 December 1937, General Matsui Iwane and Prince Asaka Yasuhiko
marched triumphantly into the city of Nanking. I will post information about
General Matsui Iwane from Wikipedia and other links. I personally do bear so
much grudge against Matsui as he was repented of his crimes, he was most
probably held responsible because of the command responsibility law.
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Matsui and Asaka marched triumphantly into
Nanking on 17 December 1937.
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General Iwane Matsui 松井石根
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Born
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July 27, 1878
Aichi prefecture, Japan |
Died
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December 23, 1948 (aged 70)
Tokyo, Japan |
Allegiance
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Empire of Japan
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Service/branch
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Imperial Japanese Army
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Years of service
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1897–1938
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Rank
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General
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Commands held
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11th Division
Taiwan Army of Japan Shanghai Expeditionary Army Central China Area Army |
Battles/wars
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Russo-Japanese War
Russian Civil War Second Sino-Japanese War |
Awards
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Order of the Golden Kite, Order of the Rising Sun
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Iwane Matsui
(松井 石根 Matsui Iwane, extra 27 July 1878 – 23 December
1948) was a general in the Imperial Japanese Army and the commander of the
expeditionary forces sent to China in World War II. He was convicted of war
crimes and sentenced to death by hanging by the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East for responsibility over the Nanking Massacre.
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松井石根, Iwane Matsui in
October 1932
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Early
life and education
Matsui
was born in Aichi prefecture as the sixth son of a former samurai
retainer of the Tokugawa clan of Owari han. Matsui graduated from the 9th class
of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1897. His classmates included future
Prime Minister Nobuyuki Abe,
and generals Sadao Araki, Jinzaburo Mazaki and Shigeru Honjō.
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Commanders on the dais of the Nanking Entry
Ceremony.
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Early
military career
Matsui
fought in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and graduated from the 18th
class of the Army Staff College in 1906. He became commanding officer of the
29th Regiment from 1919 to 1921.
From
1921 to 1922, Matsui was attached to the Vladivostok Expeditionary Force Staff
for the Japanese Siberian Intervention against Bolshevik Red Army forces in
eastern Russia. From 1922 to 1924, he was transferred to military intelligence
and made head of the Harbin Special Services Agency in Manchuria. Matsui was
then made commanding officer of the IJA 35th Infantry Brigade until 1925. From
those posts he was sent to be head of the 2nd Bureau of the Imperial Japanese
Army General Staff from 1925 to 1928, then attached to the Army General Staff
until 1929 when he was promoted to major general and assigned command of the
IJA 11th Division until 1931.
From
1931 to 1932, Matsui was a member of the Japanese delegation to the Geneva
Disarmament Conference and then again attached to the Army General Staff until
1933.
Matsui
attained the rank of general in 1933, and was appointed a member of the Supreme
War Council until 1935, except for the period from 1933 to 1934 when he was
Commander in Chief of the Taiwan Army. In 1933 he became one of the initiators
of “Greater Asia Association”, and also established a “Taiwan-Asia
Association”. He was also awarded the Order of the Rising Sun, 1st class for
his career efforts, and went into retirement from active military service in
1935.
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The Entry Ceremony into the Nanking Castle by
the Japanese forces (Dec. 17, 1937)
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Four military leaders at the Memorial
Ceremony for War Dead at Kukung Airfield: Kiyoshi Hasegawa (Commander-in-chief
of 3rd Fleet), Iwane Matsui (Commander of the Central China Area Army),
Asakanomiya (Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army), Heisuke Yanagawa
(Commander of 10th Army) (18 December 1937)
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The message of condolence of the Commander
Matsui in memorial service for the brave soldiers killed in the war at an
airport close to the Ming Dynasty palace, inside the Zhongshan Gate（December 18, 1937）
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Dedication of a sacred tree by Commander
Matsui at the memorial service of Nanking（December 18, 1937）
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Second
Sino-Japanese War
Command
of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force
However,
with the start of the Second
Sino-Japanese War, Matsui was recalled to duty on 15 August 1937 to
become the commander of the Japanese Shanghai
Expeditionary Force (SEF) during the Battle of Shanghai.
On leaving the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, Matsui remarked to War Minister
Hajime Sugiyama that: "There's no solution except to break the power of Chiang
Kai-shek by capturing Nanking. That is what I must do."
On
23 August, the SEF arrived in Shanghai, and was reinforced with the Japanese Tenth Army
commanded by Lieutenant General Heisuke Yanagawa later in October. On 7
November, Japanese
Central China Area Army (CCAA) was organized by combining the SEF
and the 10th Army, with Matsui appointed as its commander-in-chief concurrently
with that of the SEF. After winning the battles around Shanghai, the SEF
suggested the Imperial
General Headquarters in Tokyo to attack Nanking. The CCAA was
rearranged and Lieutenant General Prince Asaka
(Yasuhiko), an uncle of Emperor Hirohito, was appointed as the
commander of the SEF, while Matsui stayed as the commander of CCAA overseeing
both the SEF and the 10th Army. The real nature of Matsui's authority is
however difficult to establish as he was confronted with a member of the imperial
family directly appointed by the Emperor. In anticipation of the attack on
Nanking, Matsui issued orders to his armies that read:
Nanking is the capital of China and the capture thereof is an international affair; therefore, careful study should be made so as to exhibit the honor and glory of Japan and augment the trust of the Chinese people, and that the battle in the vicinity of Shanghai is aimed at the subjugation of the Chinese Army, therefore protect and patronize Chinese officials and people, as afar as possible; the Army should always bear in mind not to involve foreign residents and armies in trouble and maintain close liaison with foreign authorities in order to avoid misunderstandings.
On
10 December 1937, the SEF began its attack on Nanking, and the Kuomintang
forces that remained surrendered on 13 December 1937. The Nanking massacre began immediately
afterwards. Matsui and Asaka marched triumphantly into Nanking on 17 December
1937.
While
Matsui himself was not present during the beginning of the atrocities (he was
ill at the time), he was aware of what his men were doing in the city, as were
members of the Japanese foreign service who had followed the army into the
city. Word began to trickle out of Nanking, and growing pressure was placed on
the Imperial government to recall the SEF's officers.
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(l-r) Navy Commander Kiyoshi Hasegawa, Army
Commander Iwane Matsui and Lieutenant General Prince Asaka at a memorial
service held in Nanking on 18 December 1937）
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松井石根, Iwane Matsui (PHOTO
SOURCE: http://www.generals.dk/general/Matsui/Iwane/Japan.html)
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Nanking
Massacre
Concerning
atrocities in Nanking, Matsui wrote in his war journal about rapes (20
December) and looting (29 December) and wrote it was very much regrettable that
these behaviours destroyed the reputation of the Imperial Japanese Army. He
also mentioned "a number of abominable incidents within the past
50 days" at the memorial service for the war-dead of the SEF held on
7 February and rebuked, in tears, the officers and the soldiers in the place,
saying that atrocities done by a part of the army had damaged the reputation of
the empire, such a thing should not happen in the Imperial Army, they should
maintain discipline strictly and should never persecute innocent people, and so
on.
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Koa Kannon
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Second
retirement
Both
Matsui and Asaka were recalled to Japan in 1938. Matsui retired again from the
military, and returned to his hometown of Atami,
Shizuoka prefecture. Along with several others
in the community, he built a large statue of Kannon,
the Buddhist Goddess of Mercy, facing in the direction of Nanking.
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松井石根, Iwane Matsui in 1945
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The defendants at the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East Ichigaya Court: Accused Japanese war
criminals in the prisoners' box. Front row of defendants from left to right:
General Kenji Doihara; Field Marshal Shunroku Hata; Koki Hirota, former prime
minister of Japan; General Jiro Minami; General Hideki Tojo, former prime
minister of Japan; Takasumi Oka; General Yoshijiro Umezu; General Sadao Araki;
General Akira Muto; Naoki Hoshino; Okinori Kaga; Marquis Koichi Kido. Back row:
Colonel Kingiro Hashimoto; General Kuniaki Koiso; Admiral Osami Nagano; General
Hiroshi Oshima; General Iwane Matsui; Shumei Okawa; Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma;
Shigenori Togo; Yosuke Matsuoka; Mamoru Shigemitsu; General Kenryo Sato;
Admiral Shigetaro Shimada; Toshio Shiratori; Teiichi Suzuki.
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Trial
Arrested
by the American occupation authorities after the surrender of Japan, Matsui was
charged with war crimes in connection with the actions of the Japanese army in
China. In 1948, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)
found him guilty of class B and C war crimes, and he was hanged that December
at Sugamo Prison, alongside six others, including Hideki Tōjō. He was 70 at the
time of his death.
Evidence
In
court, Muto straightforwardly admitted that what the prosecutors dubbed
"the Rape of Nanking" took place. There were many other Japanese
witnesses who acknowledged that there were excesses of Japanese troops in
Nanking, though their perceptions as to the scale of the atrocities varied.
Among
the most candid witnesses was Ishii Itaro, the East Asia Bureau chief of the
Foreign Ministry. He testified that he was briefed about the rape, arson,
looting, and murders from Foreign Ministry offices in Nanjing and Shanghai. In
his autobiography, Ishii wrote that he and Foreign Minister Hirota Koki had
warned the Army many times to take action.
Verdict
and sentence
In
their decision, the Tribunal wrote:
The Tribunal is satisfied that Matsui knew what was happening. He did nothing, or nothing effective to abate these horrors. He did issue orders before the capture of the city enjoining propriety of conduct upon his troops and later he issued further orders to the same purport. These orders were of no effect as is now known, and as he must have known. It was pleaded in his behalf that at this time he was ill. His illness was not sufficient to prevent his conducting the military operations of his command nor to prevent his visiting the City for days while these atrocities were occurring. He was in command of the Army responsible for these happenings. He knew of them. He had the power, as he had the duty, to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his failure to discharge this duty.
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1948 Press Photo Former Premier Koki Hirota, Gen.Iwane
Matsui & Lt.Gen Akira Muto (PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.ebay.com/itm/1948-Press-Photo-Former-Premier-Koki-Hirota-Gen-Iwane-Matsui-Lt-Gen-Akira-Muto-/370688295072)
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Historical
assessment
In
a 2001 survey Japanese historians were harsh in their assessment of Matsui's
performance in Nanking. Professor Yutaka Yoshida, for instance, believes that
Matsui made six serious mistakes which contributed to the massacre. Firstly, he
insisted on advancing on Nanking without proper logistical support which forced
his men to rely on plunder. Secondly, he established no policies to protect the
safety of Chinese POWs. Thirdly, he permitted an excessively large number of
soldiers to enter the city of Nanking. Fourthly, he did not cooperate
sufficiently with the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone.
Fifthly, he insisted that his triumphal entrance into Nanking be held at an
early date, a demand which his subordinates responded to by increasing the
speed and severity of their mopping up operations. Finally, he spent too much
time on political manoeuvring and neglected his duties as commander. Tokushi
Kasahara, though not objecting to these points, also argued that
"Matsui alone was made into a scapegoat at the Tokyo War Crimes
Trials" when in reality many other individuals, including Prince Asaka,
were equally to blame.
The
first edition of The Rape of Nanking, by Iris Chang,
followed the IMTFE's lead in blaming Matsui for the massacre arguing the
traditional view that Matsui planned the invasion of Nanking and was Asaka's
commanding officer during the Rape. Chang however revised her position in
subsequent editions and insisted on the fact that Matsui was sick during the
massacre and that Asaka was therefore the officer in charge. James Yin and Shi
Young's book of the same title also blames Asaka for the massacre, and portrays
Matsui as a helpless figurehead stuck between a prince and an emperor. The
truth is a matter of continued debate.
INTERNET
SOURCE:
http://www.nankingatrocities.net/Tribunals/imtfe_03.htm
The
following texts were excerpted from the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East. The photographs of Matsui and Hirota were inserted
by author.
THE
ATTACK ON NANKING
When
MATSUI was appointed Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces and left
Tokyo for the fighting area, he already had thoughts of pushing on to Nanking
after the intended capture of Shanghai. He requested five divisions for the
Shanghai Expeditionary Force before leaving Tokyo. Actual preparations for the
advance upon China's capital were made, for he had previously made a study of
the topography in the vicinity of Shanghai and Nanking. On 8 October 1937,
MATSUI issued a statement in which he said:
"The devil-defying sharp
bayonets were just on the point of being unsheathed so as to develop their
divine influence, and that the mission of the Army was to fulfill all its
duties of protecting Japanese residents and interests, and to chastise the
Nanking Government and the outrageous Chinese."
As the
area of hostilities around Shanghai was likely to expand, MATSUI was appointed
Commander in Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces.
MUTO,
Akira, was appointed MATSUI'S vice-chief of staff in late November 1937.
Approximately one month after the capture of Shanghai, the Japanese Army
arrived outside the city of Nanking. MATSUI issued an order to the effect that
as Nanking was the capital of China, its capture was an international event and
careful studies should be made so as to dazzle China with Japan's military
glory. The Japanese demand for surrender was ignored by the Chinese Government.
Bombardment started and the city fell on 13 December 1937. The Japanese Army
that entered Nanking was a newly formed organization but it was composed of
experienced troops. MATSUI made his triumphant entry on 17 December 1937. From
13 December onward, there occurred what has come to be known as the "Rape
of Nanking" which will be dealt with in a later phase. On 1 January 1938,
a provisional self-governing body was set up, flying the old discarded five
colored Chinese flag instead of the Blue Sky and White Sun which is the
official national flag of China.
THE RAPE OF NANKING
As the
Central China Expeditionary Force under command of MATSUI approached the city
of Nanking in early December 1937, over one-half of its one million inhabitants
and all but a few neutrals who remained behind to organize an International
Safety Zone, fled from the city. The Chinese Army retreated, leaving
approximately 50,000 troops behind to defend the city. As the Japanese forces
stormed the South Gate on the night of 12 December 1937, most of the remaining
50,000 troops escaped through the North and West Gates of the city. Nearly all
the Chinese soldiers had evacuated the city or had abandoned their arms and
uniforms and sought refuge in the International Safety Zone and all resistance
had ceased as the Japanese Army entered the city on the morning of 13 December
1937. The Japanese soldiers swarmed over the city and committed various
atrocities. According to one of the eyewitnesses they were let loose like a
barbarian horde to desecrate the city. It was said by eyewitnesses that the
city appeared to have fallen into the hands of the Japanese as captured prey,
that it had not merely been taken in organized warfare, and that the members of
the victorious Japanese Army had set upon the prize to commit unlimited
violence. Individual soldiers and small groups of two or three roamed over the
city murdering, raping, looting, and burning. There was no discipline whatever.
Many soldiers were drunk. Soldiers went through the streets indiscriminately
killing Chinese men, women and children without apparent provocation or excuse
until in places the streets and alleys were littered with the bodies of their
victims. According to another witness Chinese were hunted like rabbits,
everyone seen to move was shot. At least 12,000 non-combatant Chinese men,
women and children met their deaths in these indiscriminate killings during the
first two or three days of the Japanese occupation of the city.
There
were many cases of rape. Death was a frequent penalty for the slightest
resistance on the part of a victim or the members of her family who sought to
protect her. Even girls of tender years and old women were raped in large
numbers throughout the city, and many cases of abnormal and sadistic behavior
in connection with these rapings occurred. Many women were killed after the act
and their bodies mutilated. Approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred within
the city during the first month of the occupation. Japanese soldiers took from
the people everything they desired. Soldiers were observed to stop unarmed
civilians on the road, search them, and finding nothing of value then to shoot
them. Very many residential and commercial properties were entered and looted.
Looted stocks were carried away in trucks. After looting shops and warehouses,
the Japanese soldiers frequently set fire to them. Taiping Road, the most
important shopping street, and block after block of the commercial section of
the city were destroyed by fire. Soldiers burned the homes of civilians for no
apparent reason. Such burning appeared to follow a prescribed pattern after a
few days and continued for six weeks. Approximately one-third of the city was
thus destroyed. Organized and wholesale murder of male civilians was conducted
with the apparent sanction of the commanders on the pretence that Chinese
soldiers had removed their uniforms and were mingling with the population.
Groups of Chinese civilians were formed, bound with their hands behind their
backs, and marched outside the walls of the city where they were killed in
groups by machine gun fire and with bayonets. More than 20,000 Chinese men of
military age are known to have died in this fashion. The German Government was
informed by its representative about "atrocities and criminal act not of
an individual but of an entire Army, namely, the Japanese," which Army,
later in the Report, was qualified as a "bestial machinery."
Those
outside the city fared little better than those within. Practically the same
situation existed in all the communities within 200 li (about 66 miles) of
Nanking. The population had fled into the countryside in an attempt to escape
from the Japanese soldiers. In places they had grouped themselves into fugitive
camps. The Japanese captured many of these camps and visited upon the fugitives
treatment similar to that accorded the inhabitants of Nanking. Of the civilians
who had fled Nanking over 57,000 were overtaken and interned. These were
starved and tortured in captivity until a large number died. Many of the
survivors were killed by machine gun fire and by bayoneting. Large parties of
Chinese soldiers laid down their arms and surrendered outside Nanking; within
72 hours after their surrender they were killed in groups by machine gun fire
along the bank of the Yangtze River. Over 30,000 such prisoners of war were so
killed. There was not even a pretence of trial of these prisoners so massacred.
Estimates made at a later date indicate that the total number of civilians and
prisoners of war murdered in Nanking and its vicinity during the first six
weeks of the Japanese occupation was over 200,000. That these estimates are not
exaggerated is borne out by the fact that burial societies and other
organizations counted more than 155,000 bodies which they buried. They also
reported that most of those were bound with their hands tied behind their
backs. These figures do not take into account those persons whose bodies were
destroyed by burning or by throwing them into the Yangtze River or otherwise
disposed of by Japanese.
Japanese
Embassy officials entered the city of Nanking with the advance elements of the
Army; and on 14 December an official of the Embassy informed the International
Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone that the "Army was determined to
make it bad for Nanking, but, that the Embassy officials were going to try to
moderate the action." The Embassy officials also informed the members of the
Committee that at the time of the occupation of the city no more than 17
military policemen were provided by the Army commanders to maintain order
within the city. When it transpired that complaints to the Army officials did
not have any result, those Japanese embassy officials suggested to the foreign
missionaries that the latter should try and get publicity in Japan, so that the
Japanese Government would be forced by public opinion to curb the Army. Dr.
Bates testified that the terror was intense for two and one-half to three
weeks, and was serious six to seven weeks following the fall of the city.
Smythe, the Secretary of the Int. Committee for the Safety Zone, filed two
protests a day for the first six weeks. MATSUI, who had remained in a rear area
until 17 December, made a triumphal entry into the city on that day and on 18
December held a religious service for the dead, after which he issued a
statement in the course of which he said:
"I extend much sympathy to
millions of innocent people in the Kiangpei and Chekiang districts, who
suffered the evils of war. Now the flag of the rising sun is floating high over
Nanking, and the Imperial Way is shining in the southern parts of the
Yangtze-Kiang. The dawn of the renaissance of the East is on the verge of
offering itself. On this occasion, I hope for reconsideration of the situation
by the 400 million people of China."
MATSUI
remained in the city for nearly a week. MUTO, then a colonel, had joined
MATSUI'S Staff on 10 November 1937 and was with MATSUI during the drive on
Nanking and participated in the triumphal entry and occupation of the city.
Both he and MATSUI admit that they heard of the atrocities being committed in
the city during their stay at rear headquarters after the fall of the city.
MATSUI admits that he heard that foreign governments were protesting against
the commission of these atrocities. No effective action was taken to remedy the
situation. Evidence was given before the Tribunal by an eyewitness that while
MATSUI was in Nanking on the 19th of December the business section of the city
was in flames. On that day the witness counted fourteen fires in the principal
business street alone. After the entry of MATSUI and MUTO into the city, the
situation did not improve for weeks.
Members
of the Diplomatic Corps and Press and the Japanese Embassy in Nanking sent out
reports detailing the atrocities being committed in and around Nanking. The
Japanese Minister-at-Large to China, Ito, Nobufumi, was in Shanghai from
September 1937 to February 1938. He received reports from the Japanese Embassy
in Nanking and from members of the Diplomatic Corps and Press regarding the
conduct of the Japanese troops and sent a resume of the reports to the Japanese
Foreign Minister, HIROTA. These reports as well as many others giving
information of the atrocities committed at Nanking, which were forwarded by
members of the Japanese diplomatic officials in China, were forwarded by HIROTA
to the War Ministry of which UMEZU was Vice-Minister. They were discussed at
Liaison Conferences, which were normally attended by the Prime Minister, War
and Navy Ministers, Foreign Minister HIROTA, Finance Minister KAYA, and the
Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. News reports of the atrocities were
widespread. MINAMI, who was serving as Governor-General of Korea at the time,
admits that he read these reports in the Press. Following these unfavorable
reports and the pressure of public opinion aroused in nations all over the
world, the Japanese Government recalled MATSUI and approximately 80 of his
officers but took no action to punish any of them. MATSUI, after his return to
Japan on 5 March 1938, was appointed a Cabinet Councilor and on 29 April 1940
was decorated by the Japanese Government for "meritorious services"
in the China War. MATSUI, in explaining his recall, says that he was not
replaced by HATA because of the atrocities committed by his troops at Nanking
but because he considered his work ended at Nanking and wished to retire from
the Army. He was never punished.
The
barbarous behavior of the Japanese Army cannot be excused as the acts of a
soldiery which had temporarily gotten out of hand when at last a stubbornly
defended position had capitulated - rape, arson and murder continued to be
committed on a large scale for at least six weeks after the city had been taken
and for at least four weeks after MATSUI and MUTO had entered the city.
The new
Japanese Garrison Commander at Nanking, General Amaya, on 5 February 1938, at
the Japanese Embassy in Nanking made a statement to the Foreign diplomatic
corps criticizing the attitude of the foreigners who had been sending abroad
reports of Japanese atrocities at Nanking and upbraiding them for encouraging
anti-Japanese feeling. This statement by Amaya reflected the attitude of the
Japanese Military toward foreigners in China, who were hostile to the Japanese
policy of waging an unrestrained punitive war against the people of China.
MATSUI,
Iwane
The
accused MATSUI is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 54 and 55.
MATSUI
was a senior Officer in the Japanese Army and attained the rank of General in
1933. He had a wide experience in the Army, including service in the Kwantung
Army and in the General Staff. Although his close association with those who
conceived and carried out the conspiracy suggests that he must have been aware
of the purposes and policies of the conspirators, the evidence before the
Tribunal does not justify a finding that he was a conspirator.
His
military service in China in 1937 and 1938 cannot be regarded, of itself, as
the waging of an aggressive war. To justify a conviction under Count 27 it was
the duty of the prosecution to tender evidence which would justify an inference
that he had knowledge of the criminal character of that war. This has not been
done.
In 1935
MATSUI was placed on the retired list but in 1937 he was recalled to active
duty to command the Shanghai Expeditionary Force. He was then appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army, which included the Shanghai
Expeditionary Force and the Tenth Army. With these troops he captured the city
of Nanking on 13th December 1937.
Before
the fall of Nanking the Chinese forces withdrew and the occupation was of a
defenseless city. Then followed a long succession of most horrible atrocities committed
by the Japanese Army upon the helpless citizens. Wholesale massacres,
individual murders, rape, looting and arson were committed by Japanese
soldiers. Although the extent of the atrocities was denied by Japanese
witnesses the contrary evidence of neutral witnesses of different nationalities
and undoubted responsibility is overwhelming. This orgy of crime started with
the capture of the City on the 13th December 1937 and did not cease until early
in February 1938. In this period of six or seven weeks thousands of women were
raped, upwards of 100,000 people were killed and untold property was stolen and
burned. At the height of these dreadful happenings, on 17 December, MATSUI made
a triumphal entry into the City and remained there from five to seven days.
From his own observations and from the reports of his staff he must have been
aware of what was happening. He admits he was told of some degree of
misbehavior of his Army by the Kempeitai and by Consular Officials. Daily
reports of these atrocities were made to Japanese diplomatic representatives in
Nanking who, in turn, reported them to Tokyo.
The
Tribunal is satisfied that MATSUI knew what was happening. He did nothing, or
nothing effective to abate these horrors. He did issue orders before the capture
of the City enjoining propriety of conduct upon his troops and later he issued
further orders to the same purport. These orders were of no effect as is now
known, and as he must have known. It was pleaded in his behalf that at this
time he was ill. His illness was not sufficient to prevent his conducting the
military operations of his command nor to prevent his visiting the City for
days while these atrocities were occurring. He was in command of the Army
responsible for these happenings. He knew of them. He had the power, as he had
the duty, to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of
Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his failure to discharge
this duty.
The
Tribunal holds the accused MATSUI guilty under Count 55, and not guilty under
Counts l, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36 and 54.
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