I also support the
death penalty for plea bargaining to make trials faster where a killer can be
sentenced to Life imprisonment. I will post the information about plea
bargaining in the United States from Wikipedia.
Supreme
Court of the United States
|
Plea bargaining in the United States is very common; the vast majority of
criminal cases in the United States are settled by plea bargain rather than by a jury trial.
They have also been increasing in frequency—they rose from 84% of federal cases
in 1984 to 94% by 2001. Plea bargains are subject to the approval of the court,
and different States and jurisdictions have different rules. Game theory has
been used to analyze the plea bargaining decision.
The
constitutionality of plea bargaining was established by Brady v. United
States in 1970, although the Supreme Court warned that plea
incentives which were sufficiently large or coercive as to over-rule
defendants' abilities to act freely, or used in a manner giving rise to a
significant number of innocent people pleading guilty, might be prohibited or
lead to concerns over constitutionality. Santobello v. New York added
that when plea bargains are broken, legal remedies exist.
Several
features of the American justice system tend to promote plea bargaining. The
adversarial nature of the system puts judges in a passive role, in which they
are completely dependent upon the parties to develop the factual record and
cannot independently discover information with which to assess the strength of
the case against the defendant. The parties thus can control the outcome of the
case by exercising their rights or bargaining them away. The lack of compulsory
prosecution also gives prosecutors greater discretion. And the
inability of crime victims to mount a private prosecution
and their limited ability to influence plea agreements also tends to encourage
plea bargaining. Prosecutors have been described as monopsonists.
History
and constitutionality
Early
history
Plea
bargaining has existed for centuries; in older legal systems convictions were
at times routinely procured by confession and laws existed covering such
criminal confessions, although by the 18th century inducements had been
forbidden in English Law to prevent miscarriage of justice. Accordingly early
US plea bargain history led to courts permitting withdrawal of pleas and
rejection of plea bargains, although such arrangements continued to happen
behind the scenes. A rise in the scale and scope of criminal law led to plea
bargaining gaining new acceptance in the early 20th century, as courts and
prosecutors sought to address an overwhelming influx of cases:
[F]ederal prosecutions under the Prohibition Act terminated in 1930 had become nearly eight times as many as the total number of all pending federal prosecutions in 1914. In a number of urban districts the enforcement agencies maintain that the only practicable way of meeting this situation with the existing machinery of the federal courts ... is for the United States Attorneys to make bargains with defendants or their counsel whereby defendants plead guilty to minor offenses and escape with light penalties.
However
even though the over 90% of convictions were based upon plea bargaining by
1930, courts remained reluctant for some time to endorse these when appealed.
Modern
history (c. 1950 onward)
The
constitutionality of plea bargaining and its placing upon a legal footing was
established by Brady v. United States in 1970. The Supreme
Court warned in the same decision, that this was conditional only
and required appropriate safeguards and usage—namely that plea incentives so
large or coercive as to over-rule defendants' abilities to act freely, or used
in a manner giving rise to a significant number of innocent people pleading
guilty, might be prohibited or lead to concerns over constitutionality.
Previous to this, the Court had held in United States
v. Jackson that a law was unconstitutional that had the effect
of imposing undue fear in a defendant (in that case, the fear of death) to the
point it discouraged the exercise of a constitutional right (the 6th Amendment covering the right to a jury
trial), and also forced the defendant to act as an unwilling witness
against himself in violation of the 5th amendment. The Court stated that:
[T]he plea is more than an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
The
ruling distinguished Brady from other prior cases emphasizing improper
confessions, concluding, "we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for
the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial
benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and
willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of
mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of
time than might otherwise be necessary." It laid down the following
conditions for a plea to be valid:
- Defendant must be "fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him"
- Plea must not be "induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e. g. bribes)"
- Pleas entered would not become invalid later merely due to a wish to reconsider the judgment which led to them, or better information about the Defendant's or the State's case, or the legal position.
- Plea bargaining "is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound results. [...] We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves. But our view is to the contrary and is based on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of the defendants' admissions".
- The ruling in Brady does not discuss "situation[s] where the prosecutor or judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty. In Brady's case there is no claim that the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence or that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty."
Santobello v. New York added that when plea bargains are
broken, remedies exist; and it has been argued that given the prevalence of
plea agreements, the most important rights of the accused may be found in the law
of contracts rather than the law of trial procedure.
Federal
system
The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
followed in federal cases and have been created to ensure a standard of
uniformity in all cases decided in the federal courts. A two- or three-level
offense level reduction is usually available for those who accept responsibility by not holding the
prosecution to the burden of proving its case.
The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide for two main types of plea agreements. An 11(c)(1)(B) agreement does
not bind the court; the prosecutor's recommendation is merely advisory, and the
defendant cannot withdraw his plea if the court decides to impose a sentence
other than what was stipulated in the agreement. An 11(c)(1)(C) agreement does
bind the court once the court accepts the agreement. When such an agreement is
proposed, the court can reject it if it disagrees with the proposed sentence,
in which case the defendant has an opportunity to withdraw his plea.
State
systems
Plea
bargains are so common in the Superior
Courts of California that the Judicial
Council of California has published an optional seven-page form
(containing all mandatory advisements required by federal and state law) to
help prosecutors and defense attorneys reduce such bargains into written plea
agreements.
In
California, plea bargaining is sometimes used in proceedings for involuntary
commitment for mental disorder. Some individuals alleged to be dangerous to
self and/or dangerous to others bargain to be classified instead as merely
"gravely disabled."
Controversy
The
shadow-of-trial argument states that plea
agreements merely reflect the outcome that would have transpired had the case
gone to trial. E.g., if the accused faces 10 years and has a 50% chance of
losing in court, then an agreement will result in a five-year sentence, less
some amount deducted for saving the government the cost of trial.
Theoretically, the shadow-of-trial should work even better in criminal cases
than in civil cases, because civil judgments are discretionary, while criminal
judgments are often regulated by mandatory minima and sentencing
guidelines, making sentences more predictable. A counter-argument is
that criminal sentencing laws are "lumpy," in that the sentencing
ranges are not as precise as the dollars-and-cents calibration that can be
achieved in civil case settlements. Further, because some defendants facing
small amounts of prison time are jailed pending trial, they may find it in
their interests to plead guilty so as to be sentenced to time served, or in any
event to end up serving less time than they would serve waiting for trial.
Outcomes in criminal cases are also made less predictable by the fact that,
while a plaintiff in a civil case has a financial incentive to seek the largest
judgment possible, a prosecutor does not necessarily have an incentive to
pursue the most severe sentence possible.
The
United States Supreme Court has recognized plea bargaining as both an essential
and desirable part of the criminal justice system. The benefits of
plea-bargaining are said to be obvious: the relief of court congestion,
alleviation of the risks and uncertainties of trial, and its information
gathering value. However, in 1975 the Attorney-General of Alaska, Avrum Gross,
ordered an end to all plea-bargaining; subsequent attorneys-general continued
the practice. Similar consequences were observed in New Orleans, Ventura
County, California, and in Oakland County, Michigan, where plea bargaining has
been terminated. Bidinotto found:
...ending plea bargaining has put responsibility back into every level of our system: police did better investigating; prosecutors and lawyers began preparing their cases better; lazy judges were compelled to spend more time in court and control their calendars more efficiently. Most importantly, justice was served—and criminals began to realize that they could not continue their arrogant manipulation of a paper-tiger court system.
Some
legal scholars argue that plea bargaining is unconstitutional because it takes
away a person's right to a trial by jury. In fact, Justice Hugo Black once noted that, in America, the
defendant “has an absolute, unqualified right to compel the State to
investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and
convince the jury through its own resources. Throughout the process, the
defendant has a fundamental right to remain silent, in effect challenging the
State at every point to ‘Prove it!’” By limiting the powers of the police and
prosecutors, the Bill of Rights safeguards freedom.
Plea
bargaining is also criticized, particularly outside the United States, on the
grounds that its close relationship with rewards, threats and coercion potentially
endangers the correct legal outcome.
In
the 1991 book Presumed Guilty: When Innocent People Are Wrongly Convicted,
author Martin Yant discusses the use of coercion in plea bargaining.
Even when the charges are more serious, prosecutors often can still bluff defense attorneys and their clients into pleading guilty to a lesser offense.As a result, people who might have been acquitted because of lack of evidence, but also who are in fact truly innocent, will often plead guilty to the charge. Why? In a word, fear. And the more numerous and serious the charges, studies have shown, the greater the fear. That explains why prosecutors sometimes seem to file every charge imaginable against defendants.
The
theoretical work based on the prisoner's dilemma is one reason why, in many
countries, plea bargaining is forbidden. Often, precisely the prisoner's
dilemma scenario applies: it is in the interest of both suspects to confess and
testify against the other suspect, irrespective of the innocence of the
accused. Arguably, the worst case is when only one party is guilty—here, the
innocent one is unlikely to confess, while the guilty one is likely to confess
and testify against the innocent.
It
has been argued that plea bargaining benefits society by ensuring
that the guilty are not acquitted.
Another
argument against plea bargaining is that it may not actually reduce the costs
of administering justice. For example, if a prosecutor has only a 25% chance of
winning his case and sending the defendant away to prison for 10 years, he may
make a plea agreement for a one-year sentence; but if plea bargaining is
unavailable, he may drop the case completely.
INTERNET SOURCE: http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/some-murderers-choose-life-in-prison-to-avoid-death-penalty/2176004
Some
murderers choose life in prison to avoid death penalty
Curtis Krueger, Times Staff Writer
Sunday, April 20, 2014 8:23pm
In
the murder case against William S. Coffin III, a grim life-or-death negotiation
came to the surface last week.
Coffin,
32, is considering pleading guilty to fatally stabbing a Largo woman and
spending the rest of his life in prison, a prosecutor said in a court hearing.
Coffin wants something in return: no death penalty.
This
might sound like the ultimate choice between bad alternatives, but it's not as
rare as it may sound.
There
have been scattered cases in the Tampa Bay area in recent years of murderers
pleading guilty to get life sentences to avoid the possibility of the death
penalty.
Like
just about everything else involving executions, it's a practice that can be
controversial and spark strong emotions.
Take
Anthony J. Giancola, a former Hillsborough County middle school principal who
gained notoriety in 2007 when he was arrested for buying cocaine in his school
office. In 2012, in an event never fully explained, Giancola went on a
murderous rampage in mid-Pinellas County.
Deborah
Clem's nephew, Justin Lee Vandenburg, 27, was one of two people Giancola killed
that day.
Last
year, Giancola pleaded guilty to two murders, four counts of attempted murder
and two counts of aggravated battery. The Pinellas-Pasco State Attorney's
Office agreed not to seek the death penalty, and he was sentenced to six
consecutive life sentences, plus 30 years.
"I
think he got off easy," Deborah Clem said. "He gets to see his
family, he gets to go to bed at night. What does my nephew get? Nothing. He
didn't even get to say goodbye."
But
in some cases, victims' families actually see this as a better alternative,
partly because they avoid the seemingly endless appeals that come with every
death penalty case.
Giancola
is not the only one who chose this route.
In
January, Egan Fernando Atkins admitted in Hillsborough Circuit Court that he
broke into a home and stabbed a woman with a kitchen knife. His guilty plea
gave him a life sentence and spared him the death penalty.
Last
year, Michael Scott Norris pleaded guilty to killing two men in St. Petersburg
after he escaped a Largo work-release center. Prosecutors agreed not to seek
the death penalty, and Norris got three life sentences.
Under
Florida law, judges have only two options for those convicted of first-degree
murder: the death penalty or life in prison with no parole.
But
it's not easy for prosecutors to obtain a death sentence. Under the law, people
can be sentenced to death only when the killing involves certain
"aggravating circumstances," such as murder committed for money or
one that was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." On the other
hand, juries and judges weigh "mitigating circumstances" that argue
against the death penalty, such as whether the defendant had an otherwise clean
record, or whether he was mentally impaired.
Pinellas-Pasco
State Attorney Bernie McCabe said key for him in any case is to listen to
victims' families.
"There
are some that don't like the death penalty, don't agree with it," he said.
"There are others that want it, very strongly want it."
Also
important, he said, is trying to predict whether a jury would recommend a death
sentence, a judge would impose it, and appeals courts would uphold it.
In
the case of a death penalty for Giancola, "I thought it was going to be a
real uphill climb to get it, and an even bigger uphill climb to keep it,"
said McCabe, citing the killer's mental health issues.
In
court last week, Assistant State Attorney Richard Ripplinger said attorneys for
Coffin, accused of murdering Patricia Ann King, 50, in her Largo home, had
mentioned the idea of a guilty plea.
Ripplinger
said that before the state would consider it, he wanted to make sure the
defense had more information about the case — a move apparently designed to
make sure Coffin is fully informed and less likely to file an appeal later.
If
a judge sentences a man or woman to death, appeals can easily last more than a
decade. That's one reason their families sometimes don't mind a guilty plea and
life sentence, said Mark Cox, spokesman for the Hillsborough State Attorney's
Office.
"We've
had cases where the victim's family no longer wishes us to go after the death
penalty, not so much for the defendant, but for their wishes," he said.
"They want closure."
All
options are difficult, and there can be different opinions even within the same
families, said Bobbie Hodson, victim advocate for the Pinellas County Sheriff's
Office. "There's no happy ending in a murder case, unfortunately."
There
is one thing some families appreciate about a guilty plea. The killer has to
stand up in court and admit he or she did it. That often does not happen in a
trial, not even when someone is sentenced to death.
Because
of the trials and appeals, various studies argue that the cost of prosecuting
murder defendants actually exceeds the cost of simply imprisoning them for
life. Although politicians and advocates argue the cost-effectiveness, this
particular debate stays mostly out of the courtroom. The lawyers are supposed
to be arguing for justice, not savings.
Defendants
usually plead guilty only when the evidence is overwhelming.
But
from their point of view, is life in prison really much better than execution?
It
can be. On death row, killers are housed individually and spend little time
outside cells. Inmates know they'll spend more than a decade that way.
But
a murderer sentenced to life can be housed in the general prison population,
where "you can work, you can socialize, you can make some sort of life for
yourself," said defense attorney Bjorn Brunvand.
Times researcher Natalie Watson and staff writer Sue
Carlton contributed to this report. Curtis
Krueger can be reached at ckrueger@tampabay.com (727) 893-8232. On Twitter:
@ckruegertimes.
Some murderers choose
life in prison to avoid death penalty 04/20/14 [Last modified: Sunday, April 20, 2014 10:39pm]
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